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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah, and MURRAY CITY, a
municipal corporation of the
State of Utah,

Case No. 2300-16

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
~vs~
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the
State of Utah; DELMAR L. LARSEN,
Sheriff of Salt Lake County;
W. STERLING EVANS, Clerk of
Salt Lake County,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
Salt Lake City Corporation
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to require Salt Lake County, and its
County Clerk and County Sheriff to accept and serve legal documents, without charge, pursuant to the provisions of Section
21-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Bryant H. Croft of the Third Judicial District ruled
that Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953, exempted cities from
paying fees to the clerk and the sheriff for filing and service
of papers.

The Lower Court, thus, granted Plaintiff-Respondent,

Salt Lake City's, Motion for summary Judgment and denied
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-respondent, Salt Lake City, seeks this Court
to affirm the ruling of the lower court that cities are exempt
from filing, and service fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cities have not been charged for filing civil papers or
serving papers since 189 8 in any State court, including the Utah
Supreme Court.

In September of 1975, Salt Lake County notified

Salt Lake City that they would start charging for these services
and, in fact, did charge for the service.

The City brought suit

for Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamas compelling the
defendants to conform to the requirements of Section 21-7-2,
Utah Code Ann. 1953.

Murray City was granted leave to inter-

vene as a party-plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE WHICH
GOVERNS THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANY STATUTE.
"In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative
will is the all-important or controlling factor." 73Am.Jur. 2d, 'Statutes11, § 145.
The Rules of Statutory Construction are designed for no
other reason than to ascertain and declare the intention of the
Legislature.
"However, since all rules for the interpretation of
statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object
the discovery of the legislative intent, every technical
rule as to the construction of a statute must yield to
the expression of the paramount will of the legislature."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
• 73 Am.Jur.
2d,
"Statutes", § 146.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This point was stated by the United States Supreme Court
in one of the earliest cases setting forth what plan would be
good for this Country:
"And the intention of the Legislature, when discovered,
must prevail, any rule of construction declared by previous
acts to the contrary notwithstanding. Brown v. Barry,
3 U.S. 365, 1 L.Ed. 638 (1797).
(Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court has also clearly stated this point
in Rowley v. Public Service Commission, 112 U.116, 185 P.2d
514 (1947).

This Court observed:

" . . . it is well to determine the purpose of the
enactment. This is of importance in interpreting the
act, as the purpose which underlies a statute is often
regarded as speaking as plainly as the words forming the
enactment."
At the end of the opinion, the Court quoted Sutherland on
Statutory Construction:
11 r

In the exposition of a statute the intention of the
lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms;
and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict
letter. When the words are not explicit the intention
is to be collected from the context, from the occasion
and necessity of the law; from the mischief felt, and the
remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason and good
discretion.f"
Therefore, the question before the Court in construing
Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953, becomes:

What did the

Legislature intend when they enacted the statute in question, and
what does that statutory language provide?"
POINT II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE IN QUESTION LEAVES NO DOUBT CITIES ARE
EXEMPT FROM PAYING COUNTY FILING OR SHERIFF
SERVICE FEES,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The original provision governing fees, as passed at the
First Session of the State Legislature, reads as follows:
"The officers mentioned in this act are not in
any case except for the State or a county, to perform
any official services, except on cases of habeas
corpus, and on such payment the officer must perform
the service required.1' Laws of Utah, Chapter CXXXI,
§ 161 (1896).
(Emphasis added.
The Court will note that only counties and the State were
exempted from paying fees to the sheriff under this statute.
In 189 8 this statutory provision was changed to read:
"The state and county officers mentioned in this title
shall not in any case perform any official service unless
the fees prescribed for such service are paid in advance,
and on such payment the officer must perform the service
required; and for every failure or refusal to perform
official duty, when the fees are tendered, any officer
shall be liable upon his official bond; provided, that
no fees shall be charged the state, or any county or subdivision thereof, or any public officer acting theretor,
or in cases of habeas corpus, or in criminal causes before
final judgment, or for administering and certifying the
oath of office, or for swearing pensioners and their
witnesses, or for filing and recommending bonds for
public officers." Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, Chapter
7, § 1016. (Emphasis added)
The language above quoted has remained the same and is the language of the present statute, above quoted, despite revisions
of the code in 1917, 1933, 1943 and 1953.
This amendment was considered to be an important modification
of the law.

This point was stated by the Utah Code revision com-

mission notes of 1898.

They said:

11

. . . of the changes made by the commission and
adopted by the legislature, the more important are
as follows: . . . Amendment in fee bills; . . . "
Preface to Revised Statutes of Utah 1898.
One of the changes in "fee bills" was the inclusion of the phrase
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or county or subdivision thereof11 in the exemptions.

Thus,

the Legislature deliberately amended the restrictive exemption
of the former statute and included in its new law an exemption
for any "subdivision11 of the State.

Those word changes were

considered important and must be given meaning.

The only real

question before the Court is to construe the legislative intent
when it added to the exempt classifications a "subdivision" of
the State or County.

That is, was it the intent of the legis-

lative amendment to grant cities an exemption from county filing
and service charges?
In construing that intent, of great significance is the
administrative interpretion placed on the amendment language
for the past 75 years of its existence.

The undisputed record

shows that since 1898 no municipal subdivision has been charged
for any fee, either to file civil complaints or for service of
process.

In fact, the undisputed facts show that the Supreme

Court of Utah and the Third Judicial District Courts have not
charged cities since 189 8 for court costs.

Why?

Because the

contemporary clerks and judges were aware that the 1898 change
in fee bills, included an exemption for cities.

For over 75

years, the persons charged with implementing legislative intent
have consistently construed the statute to exclude cities from
payment of fees.

This Court has ruled that administrative

interpretation is entitled to some consideration and may be
regarded as persuasive.

Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Anderson,

30 U.2d 102, 514 P.2d 217.
Appellant
submits 75 years of 'unswerving interpretation is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Significantly, no Legislature has changed this statutory
language even though the Legislature has been aware of the
administrative interpretation placed upon it by the Court Clerks
and Sheriffs in every judicial district of this State.

The

Legislature in retaining the language, despite several recodifications and knowledge of the administrative interpretations
thereof, must be presumed to have adopted, if not intended, the
result that cities are included in the exemption.

82 C.J.S.

Statutes, § 370, p. 855, State Board of Land Commissioners v.
Ririe, 56 U.213, 190 P. 59, State v. Hatch, 9 U.2d 288, 342
P.2d 1103.
POINT III
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION
21-7-2, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, CLEARLY SHOWS THAT
THE CITY IS EXEMPTED FROM THE PAYMENT OF FEES.
The phrase "or any county or subdivision thereof" clearly
relates back to the noun "State."
word "State."

The modifier is the whole

Any other construction would make the word "sub-

division" surplusage and "duplicative of the word "County."
The English sentence construction to arrive at the result
Appellant urges would have to read "or any county and its
subdivisions."

'

The words chosen were chosen advisedly and under the "Last
Antecedent Doctrine1' of Statutory Construction, qualifying
words, phrases and clauses in a statute are applied to the word
or phrase immediately preceding.

This method of construction

clearly shows that the phrase relates back to the word "State."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT IV
CITIES ARE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Art. VI, § 26, of the Utah Constitution contains an enumeration of prohibitions against the Legislature which enumerates
the cities and counties; it provides:
"The legislature may repeal any existing special
law relating to the foregoing subdivisions,
(Emphasis added)
Thus, at the creation of the State and nearly contemporaneous
with the passage of exemptions in fee bills, under discussion,
the founders of this State considered municipalities subdivisions of the State.
The State statutes also consistently refer to cities as
subdivisions -of the State of Utah.

Some examples of this fact

are:
1.

Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. 1953, which defines

cities as "political subdivisions."
2.

Section 51-3-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, which reads:

"When the state or any county, city, town or other political subdivision thereof . . ."

(Emphasis added)

The entire chapter 3

of Title 51, is entitled "Accounts of Political Subdivisions."
Any argument that claims the City is not a subdivision of
the State implies that once a City is created by the Legislature,
it becomes a "city-state."

Our courts have repeatedly held

that such a principle is not applicable in Utah; rather, our
law clearly provides that all powers of cities are derived
from the State.

The State may change the powers of a city as

long as the change is uniform for that class of cities
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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affected.

Art. XI, § 5, Constitution of Utah,

Thus, there can be no serious question that a Utah municipality is a political subdivision of the State.
POINT V
SECTION'21-7-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES
NOT LIMIT THE EXEMPTION TO "LEGAL SUBDIVISIONS"
OF A COUNTY AND ANY SUCH LIMITATION DOES NOT
- NECESSARILY EXCLUDE CITIES FROM ITS TERM.
Appellant urges the argument that the word subdivision as
used meant "Legal Subdivision" of counties, as defined by Art.
XI, § 1, Constitution of Utah.

Appellant correctly described

a rule of construction when he stated that each term of a,
statute is considered to be used advisedly.
also true.

The converse is

If a word is not used the omission should likewise

be taken note of and given effect.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v.

Anderson, 30 U.2d 102, 514 P.2d 207 (1973).

The word "legal"

was not attached as a modifier for the word subdivision, showing the Legislature used the term in its broad sense and did
not limit it to "legal subdivision" of a county.

It applied to

the exemption to all subdivisions of the State.
Besides straining the plain language of the statute to
include a new word "legal," the argument of defendant-appellant
is logically inconsistent.

Appellant acknowledges that the

words "Legal Subdivision" includes school districts and precincts.
Further, as pointed out in Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision,
Section 17-16-5,"Utah Code Annotated 1953, specifically states
that cities are considered one precinct within the county;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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therefore, logically a city would be a legal subdivision of
the county.

This fact is true even under the classification

Appellant urges.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that under any
construction of the statute, the City is exempt from the filing
and service fees.
County

It is a subdivision of both the State and

within the meaning and intent of the statute in question.
POINT VI
CITIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE FINANCING AND OPERATION
OF THE DISTRICT COURT.

The City residents pay the same taxes as county residents,
in addition to paying taxes to run city governments.

The County

itself is nothing more than its collective taxpaying citizens.
County government does administer the funds and collect the
taxes, but that is not sufficient distinction to require the
City to pay service and filing fees for court actions.

If it

were, the County should rebate to the City the funds collected
so that the City could pay the District Court and sheriff fees
directly without causing our taxpayers to pay double for the
same service a resident of an unincorporated area pays.
The County courts are not restricted to non-incorporated
areas and our citizens are entitled to have the City use the
courts free of charge for the carrying out of governmental
functions of the City.

Each government is nothing more than

an administrator to meet the taxpayer1s needs and to claim
should be an exempt government and the other not exempt is
assinine when the taxpayers are one and the same.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

one

-10-

To refute this argument, Appellants point out that cities
must pay for use of Federal Courts.

Appellants fail to appre-

ciate that we have two different autonomous levels of government in the United States, the State and the Central government.
The Central government, commonly known as the Federal government,
makes its courts open without fee for its governmental uses.

The

State government, specifically Utah, does the same by making its
State courts available to its governmental subdivisions of which
the cities are included, without payment of fees.
We do not have different autonomous levels of government
in Utah.

All local governments in Utah derive their powers from

the State and they cannot and do not claim the autonomy from the
State that the States rightfully claim from the Central government through Amendment X to the United States Constitution.
SUMMARY
It is submitted that 75 years of administrative interpretation, as well as legislative history, show that cities are
exempted under the provisions of Section 21-7-2, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, from payment of fees.
Respectfully submitted,
ROGER F. CUTLER
City Attorney
GREG R. HAWKINS
Assistant City Attorney
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDED
Salt Lake City Corporation
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